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Abstract 
There have been several cases of abuse of political power bordering on corruption charges levied against 
political office holders, companies, individuals operating in the private sector and several public officers in 
Nigeria. Overtime, public sector auditors have undertaken the audits of government Ministries, Department and 
Agencies’ (MDAs) accounting procedures and financial statements by reviewing the legality of transactions 
made by the audited body to ascertain the efficiency and effectiveness of government programmes. How then 
should the public sector auditor carryout his duties in such a manner that enables him to detect opportunities for 
corruption as he may not be in position to quantify or report it? This paper seeks to identify the role of the 
Auditor General who heads the Supreme Audit Institution in Nigeria and the public sector auditor in fighting 
corruption and it concludes on the premise that effective corruption control requires the commitment and 
involvement of all citizens of the society. 
Keywords: corruption, public sector auditor, Nigeria 
 
1. Introduction 
Audit is one of the mechanisms pivotal to the fight against corruption. Most of the standard setting in the 
auditing profession has taken place in the private sector and corruption has not been a serious issue in the private 
sector because the auditing profession, as it has evolved, has its roots in the private sector where audit against 
corruption is not a serious concern of the stakeholders who are more interested in fraud or theft of their assets. 
This, no doubt is responsible for the very little discussion in the literature on corruption auditing and probably 
the want of standards for auditing corruption.  
Almost all professional bodies of auditors across the globe have published standards and techniques about fraud 
auditing. A large number of organizations have offered training courses on fraud auditing. There is also an 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners who awards certificates to those who qualify their examination.  The 
Internal Auditor, journal of the Institute of Internal Auditors, USA, has devoted a regular feature to fraud 
auditing and reporting. In a very legitimate sense, corruption auditing is a concern of the government auditors or 
public sector internal auditors who have remained dormant in methodology development in this field. The 
United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Vienna, which is spearheading the campaign 
against corruption has published a wealth of literature on corruption, including an Anti-Corruption Tool-Kit in 
its Manual on AntiCorruption Policy. It has identified thirty tools for fighting corruption; regrettably, auditing is 
not even part of this list.  However, the Manual devoted a page to auditing at a later stage. The INTOSAI Journal 
of Government Auditing, the most prestigious publication of the world government auditors, has published only 
two articles during 2000-05 on corruption. It appears there is a general neglect of this subject in the methodology 
tool-kit of the auditing profession (Khan, 2006).   
In their professional work, while working in a large bureaucratic organization or a government department, 
auditors ‘smell’ corruption but feel that they are helpless to deal with it. They do not find handy tools in their 
tool-kit to handle the problem. Auditors know that they cannot physically see all transactions and all situations.  
An example is the bribe taken by a police constable from a violator of traffic signal. No one can ever detect it 
until the policeman is caught red-handed. The auditors are not in the business of catching people ‘red-handed.’ 
Thus, they cannot do much in such cases. Similarly, the auditors do not deal with political, social, or cultural 
corruption. Even when we exclude these areas, the auditors still come across corruption in government offices 
and in large public and private organizations that fall under the purview of the auditors’ routine work. There 
could be situations, in large public or private sector organizations and in government departments, where the 
rules and regulations are quite foolproof, yet corruption continues to flourish because of poor implementation. 
The auditors can point out these weaknesses as potential sources of corruption. The rules, regulations, 
procedures and operational standards of these organizations often leave lacunae, which create opportunities for 
corruption or at least protect corruption. Auditors deal with such phenomena.  The auditors find themselves at 
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cross-purposes with the society. The social expectations are that the auditors should play an effective role in 
reducing, if not eliminating, corruption. The auditors, whose profession makes them concentrate on documentary 
or physical evidence, often find it hard to gather such evidence. They feel that they cannot do much about 
corruption. In such a situation, what precisely is the role of the auditors? The paper aims to define the role of 
auditors in fighting corruption.   
 
2. Nature of Corruption and Auditing 
Probably due to the pervasive nature of corruption, the concept has always dominated discussions across the 
globe at different fora among communities and in the academic arena. Consequently, there are as many 
definitions of corruption as there are writers. However we will adopt a working definition of corruption as the 
process of circumventing formally agreed or implicit rules for decision-making (in the public or private sector) 
by use of personal inducements in order to achieve institutional and/or personal objectives. 
As documented by Machiavelli (cited in Heidenheimer, 1993) “Corruption can be defined as a process by which 
the virtue of the citizen is undermined and eventually destroyed” and argued "that man had been corrupted by 
social and political life. It is not the corruption of man which destroyed the political system but the political 
system which corrupts and destroys man." Heidenheimer (1993) also reported that Montesquieu on his part 
considered corruption as the dysfunctional process by which a good political order is perverted into evil one and 
a monarchy into despotism. He further recorded that according to Rosseau, political corruption is a necessary 
consequences of the struggle for power. 
Corruption can be defined as the use of public office or the use of official position, rank or status by an office 
bearer for his own personal benefit Myint (2000:35). While activities such as fraud and embezzlement can be 
undertaken by an official alone and without involvement of a second party, others such as bribery, extortion and 
influence peddling involve two parties – the giver and taker in a corrupt deal. Two party type of corruption can 
arise under a variety of circumstances such as: Government contracts, Government benefits, Government 
revenue, Time savings and regulatory avoidance,   Influencing outcomes of legal and regulatory processes Myint 
(2000:35). 
Corruption or "corrupt" behavior   has broadly been defined as the violation of established rules for personal gain 
and profit" (Sen 1999), or "efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means – private gain at public 
expense; or a misuse of public power for private benefit (Lipset & Lenz, 2000) or a behavior which deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role, because of private gain (Nye, 1967). 
This definition includes such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a 
position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private uses (Banfield 1961).  
The World Bank cited in Obayelus (2007:4) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gains 
through rent seeking activities when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. Public office is also abused 
when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage 
and profit or even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets or the diversion 
of state resources (World Bank 1997). According to Kaufmann (2005:82), the traditional definition of corruption   
as the “abuse of public office for private gain” is very narrow as it places too much emphasis on public office, 
and on the ostensible legality of the act. He analyzed the implications of viewing corruption as a broader 
phenomenon where private agents also share responsibility, and where many acts which are not ethical (and thus 
may be regarded as corrupt) may not necessarily be illegal and presented empirical evidence of the extent to 
which many powerful private firms engage in undue influence, to shape state policies, laws and regulations, for 
their own benefit. He further highlighted the extent to which they make campaign contributions, which may, in 
fact, be legal, but which unduly influences the rules of the game, for their benefit. Moreover, from the Survey 
results he showed that favoritism toward particular firms in the award of public procurement bids and contracts 
is widespread. Tanzi (1995) gave a more neutral definition of corruption as “the intentional noncompliance with 
arm's length relationship aimed at deriving some advantage from this behavior for oneself or for related 
individuals”.  
Even though some of these definitions of corruption have been around for over decades, the recent development 
in Nigeria where discoveries of stolen public funds run into billions of US Dollars and Nigeria Naira, make these 
definitions very adequate and appropriate. Corruption is probably the main means to accumulate quick wealth in 
Nigeria. Corruption occurs in many forms, and it has contributed immensely to the poverty and misery of a large 
segment of the Nigerian population (Dike, 2002:2). 
Auditing is the process of examining accounts by a professional called auditor with a view to give an opinion on 
the truth and fairness of the state of affairs of the entity audited. The word auditor was derived from the Latin 
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‘audire’, meaning “to hear”. The objectives of public sector auditing are to ensure the proper and effective use of 
public funds; the development of sound financial management; the proper execution of administrative activities; 
and  the communication of information to public authorities and the general public through the publication of 
objective reports. In line with these core functions public sector auditors have traditionally undertaken financial 
audits of organisations’ accounting procedures and financial statements, and compliance audits of reviewing the 
legality of transactions made by the audited body. The scope of the exercise covers the scrutiny of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of government programmes through performance or value for money (VFM) audits.  
Financial auditing assesses the accuracy and fairness of both the accounting procedures utilised by a government 
agency and the financial statements it produced. The primary question that it investigates is: “Do the audited 
statements or reports accurately portray the financial condition and/or activities of the audited entity?” Without 
such audits it is very unlikely that we would know what the government does with public resources because 
reliable documents with this information would not be otherwise published. Compliance audits assess whether 
funds were used for the purposes for which they were appropriated by the legislature and in compliance with the 
relevant laws and regulations. The primary question that they ask is: “Did the audited entity comply with 
applicable laws and regulations?” Transactions are reviewed to determine whether government departments and 
agencies conformed to all pertinent laws and regulations. Without compliance audits we would not know, for 
example, whether budgeted resources were spent on the items approved by the legislature. Public sector audit in 
developed countries have started moving beyond these basic audit functions to evaluate “the proper and effective 
use of public funds.” This has led them to explore performance audits that analyse cost-effectiveness (economy), 
operational efficiency, and the general effectiveness of government programmes in achieving their objectives. 
(Albert, Vivek & Paolo, 2009:8) 
 
3. The Role of the Auditor in Fighting Corruption  
Corruption requires a multifaceted attack. It requires, for example, a set of regulations against corrupt practices, 
a code of conduct for employees and vendors, awareness raising campaigns, training of staff, internal controls, 
sanctions and incentives, protection of whistleblowers and an open approach towards information reporting. 
Audit is one such mechanism pivotal to fighting corruption. However, the auditors can succeed only if the 
enabling environment exists for fighting corruption. Effective corruption control requires commitment and 
involvement of all agencies, employees, customers, external service providers, in brief, all citizens of the society. 
Khan (2006:10) opines that “as a starting point for corruption auditing, the auditors should hold on to the 
traditional assumptions about the behavior of the staff with respect to organization’s business and should not 
commence audit planning with the suspicion of corruption”. He posited that the auditor should remain alert to 
the opportunities for corruption at the stage of familiarization of the organization and its operations and therefore, 
proceed cautiously. In the process of normal audit planning, they should try to determine the possibilities of 
corruption through review of departmental laws, regulations, rules and procedures. Besides, in the process of 
interviews of key personnel, they should identify any opportunities for corruption.  
The auditor’s tool kit for fighting against corruption includes: compliance audit, financial audit, and performance 
audit.  While compliance audit involves assessing compliance with environmental legislation or organizational 
policies, financial audit addresses the possibility of misstatements in financial statements which can stem from 
errors or fraud. Auditors are concerned with fraud that causes a material misstatement. Such a misstatement can 
result from fraudulent financial reporting or from misappropriation of assets, and examples of both can be found 
in international audit guidelines, such as ISSAI 1240. Thorough and detailed risk analysis is essential for 
auditors to detect indications of financial malfeasance, for example in public procurement. The greater the risk, 
the more thorough the audit must be. Performance audits can be an especially powerful instrument to help 
prevent corruption. Auditors can usefully analyse the quality of internal controls in public administration. They 
can for example identify weaknesses in segregation of duties, controls over access to resources, records 
management, or the ‘tone at the top’, including whether top officials lead by example.   
3.1Using Performance Audit as a Tool of Corruption Auditing  
It is generally understood that performance auditing can help detect corruption (Dye & Rick, 1998). A properly 
planned and executed performance audit would highlight areas of diseconomy, inefficiency and failure to 
achieve results and impact. The argument is that if a project or program has been planned properly, it should be 
possible to implement it with due regard for economy and efficiency and it should achieve its results. If it 
exceeds its planned costs significantly or takes much longer than envisaged or does not achieve what was 
intended, then there is a possibility that the people involved in its management may have indulged in corruption.   
Although the above argument is plausible, yet the existence of diseconomy, inefficiency or ineffectiveness is not 
a conclusive proof of corruption. There could be genuine reasons of human failings, or complex and difficult 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.4, 2013 
 
125 
environmental factors which inhibited the achievement of objectives. There could, simply, be a case of 
unintentional human negligence, not taking into account all the risks and costs. Thus, performance auditing 
carried out in a routine manner may not indicate a concrete evidence of corruption.  Performance auditing can, 
however, provide some clue to corruption if it exists. For this purpose, the performance auditors need to go a 
step deeper into the issues identified during the audit planning stage (Khan, 2006:19).   
Generally, if the findings of the performance audit are of the following nature, the suspicion that corruption had 
taken place in these projects or programs would be quite high: 
 (a) Corruption indicated by lack of economy: Cost overruns have taken place as a result of subsequent increase 
in the scope of work which has not been approved by the competent authority;  
The accountability mechanism for exceeding the budget is weak suggesting that if a program manager exceeds 
his or her budget, he or she can get away with it, without much accountability; The unit cost of some 
components of the total procurement is exorbitant, while the overall bid price is the lowest, the components with 
higher prices are subject of repeat orders; Bids for competitive procurement may be cancelled frequently to help 
a specific vendor get the award of the contract; After competitive bidding, the prices are increased by adding 
some small segments of goods and services not originally conceived; Procurement  is rushed at the year-end to 
consume the budget; In case of privatization, the friends, relations or front men of persons making the decision 
of privatization purchase the public asset indicating that obvious conflict of interest exists; The options analysis 
for justifying the project or program was based on fake data or false assumptions; Based on bogus assumptions, 
the decision to provide in-house services as compared to outsourcing through competitive bidding may be with 
the intention of having access to a greater chunk of the budget and thus creating opportunity for the staff to 
indulge in corruption and misappropriation; Large known dealers in certain line  of products systematically avoid 
participating in the open bidding process of the organization. Usually, they do not like to get into the ‘hassle’ of 
getting their invoices paid in a corrupt environment. 
(b) Corruption indicated by lack of efficiency. This consists of: Huge idle capacity or unnecessary equipment 
purchased without significant possibilities of use even over time; disproportionately high expenditure on 
maintenance soon after the completion of the project; neglect of regular maintenance thus allowing infrastructure 
to deteriorate while new projects are being planned. (The intention of neglecting routine maintenance is to divert 
funds toward new projects);  Poor quality of construction, shoddy materials, choked gutters, clogged drains, 
piling of waste material  and rubbish around construction sites are indicators of corruption;  Abnormal time-over 
run (over and above a reasonable figure adopted as audit criteria) accepted and regularized by the management 
as ‘beyond control’;  Repeated extensions are given to the contractors; Repeated change orders are issued 
leading to changes in the scope of work and prices to be paid or changes made in the quality of the goods and 
services to be delivered. Repeated transfers of the project staff are made to ensure complete absence of 
institutional memory or continuity of oversight within the organization; Liquidated damages clause in the 
contract defined in such a manner that it does not have a bite; An over-load of controls, or existence of 
complicated procedures leading to delay in delivery of service and inducing the clients to offer bribes; Absence 
of any service delivery benchmarks and excessive time taken for issuing licenses and permits, encouraging 
payment of speed money(Rose-Ackerman,1999). 
(c) Corruption indicated by lack of effectiveness takes the form of: Well-articulated, measurable or quantified 
performance indicators do not exist; Actual internal rate of return (IRR) is significantly lower than anticipated; 
Perceived clients’ dissatisfaction with the delivery of services. Surveys have revealed that outputs and services 
are not delivered as planned or quality is seriously undermined, there are barriers to reach the senior 
management for protesting against poor quality of service and there is no other complaint handling mechanism 
to address the complaints of the unsatisfied users of services. 
The performance auditing can help minimize corruption by creating deterrent. The following are some good 
practices the public sector auditor can adopt:  
(a) The top management or governing body should encourage performance auditing over routine compliance 
auditing.  
(b) The top management should inform all program managers that their performance would be audited. All 
programs and projects should be subjected to performance audit periodically.   
(c) The top management should support the performance auditors in developing mutually acceptable 
performance audit criteria and all managers should be aware of the criteria.  
(d) The top management should also prescribe in detail the mechanism for accumulating data and other 
information on performance of the program at the levels of individual manager, unit or section. The performance 
auditors should take these data as assertions of the management about their performance and verify these 
assertions during their audit work. 
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4. The role of SAIs in combating corruption 
Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are national-level watchdog agencies responsible for the audit of government 
revenue and expenditure. By scrutinizing public financial management and reporting they provide assurance that 
resources are used as directed by national governments. SAIs are not specialised anticorruption agencies: on the 
whole they are not expressly charged with detecting or investigating corrupt activity (Alastair, 2008:2). In 
Nigeria this is represented by a National Audit Office headed by an independent Auditor General which submits 
audit reports to a committee of the National Assembly (often the Public Accounts Committee). The Lima 
declaration, first published by INTOSAI in 1977, identifies four objectives of public sector auditing. These 
objectives are to promote: 
? The proper and effective use of public funds; 
? The development of sound financial management; 
? The proper execution of administrative activities; and 
? The communication of information to public authorities and the general public through the publication 
of objective reports. 
 4.1 The Remit of SAIs to Fight Corruption 
 4.1.1Deterrence and Prevention 
The central role of SAIs in combating corruption is the promotion of sound financial management and the 
encouragement of robust internal control mechanisms in public bodies. In particular, strong financial 
management systems, based on effective financial reporting and the disclosure of any deviations, have a 
dissuasive effect on those who might otherwise engage in corruption. This deterrent role has been widely 
elaborated on, and in particular, it is seen to contribute to a wider environment which militates against corrupt 
activity. It is argued that a system of financial checks and controls bolsters accountability by providing assurance 
that reported information is credible and that financial reporting promotes the transparency of government 
spending. As such a national SAI provides the public with information on accepted standards of financial 
management and probity and details of any deviations from these standards or from legality. In particular 
commentators stress the importance of these functions to the wider institutional framework, where they are seen 
to bolster the application of the rule of law and add to the predictability of government behaviour 
 4.1.2 SAIs and National Integrity Systems 
The importance of SAIs to fighting corruption is often placed in the context of countries’ wider National 
Integrity System (NIS). In prevailing models of NIS, SAIs comprise one of the institution pillars (alongside 
institutions such as the legislature, executive, judiciary, ombudsman, and electoral management bodies) upon 
which rests the strength of a country’s integrity. These pillars are seen to be interdependent, and it is argued that 
any weakening in the effectiveness of one can place a greater strain on the others. In this model a well-
functioning NIS provides effective safeguards against corruption whereas weaker institutions allow corruption to 
thrive and undermine the rule of law, quality of life and sustainable development. Strengthening any of the 
institutions comprising the NIS, including SAIs, promotes better governance across all aspects of society, and 
helps to fight corruption. 
Musa Kayrak, of the Turkish Court of Accounts, has identified the types of corruption most likely to be detected 
by auditors in the course of their work. These include falsified statements and claims, purchasing for personal 
use, illegal bidding practices in procurement competitions, and tax or duty evasion. Similarly, Fred M. Siame, 
the Auditor General of Zambia, has set out common areas of concern identified by auditors in Zambia. These 
include irregularities in the award of procurement contacts, overpayment for and non-delivery of goods and 
services, third-party transactions, and malpractice in the liquidation of public companies. 
Some countries explicitly require SAIs to report on such instances of suspected corruption and criminal activity. 
These include the SAIs of Germany, Sweden, and the UK, but also their equivalents in developing countries 
such as India, Indonesia and the Philippines. While some SAIs do have limited investigative authority, the 
further investigation of such cases is generally passed to the police or specialist anticorruption agencies. In 
particular, SAIs ability to directly investigate corrupt practice is limited by their remit, which does not extend to 
examining the activities or personal records (for example bank account details) of citizens or private companies.  
Similarly, although many SAIs have legal provisions to prosecute corrupt practices, prosecution is generally 
undertaken by law enforcement agencies.  
 4.2 Strengthening the Anti-Corruption role of SAIs 
Fighting corruption requires a multi-pronged attack. It requires reforms, inter alia, in public administration, 
judiciary, public information, and cultural values of the society. The individual auditor or even an internal audit 
department of a government or public sector organization cannot propose actions beyond what cannot be 
implemented by their respective auditees. There are actions which have to be taken by the government or which 
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require political will of the state. For such actions, only an institution like SAI can take the initiative. For this 
purpose, the SAI itself needs to be strong and well-resourced. The present part of the paper endeavors to suggest 
a mechanism to strengthen the SAI and the action that the SAI can take in turn to prevent or minimize corruption. 
The action on this score is important because until the SAI is strong enough and is able to play the leadership 
role, the individual auditors or even lower level audit departments cannot make much of a difference in the fight 
against corruption. 
Although there is a general agreement that the SAI should play an effective role in promoting transparency, 
governance and accountability, yet most of the SAIs in the developing world still lacks adequate independence 
and resources to play this role.  
4.2.1 Focusing Audit on Areas of Corruption Risk 
In some cases SAIs have extended their role beyond deterrence and prevention and taken a more active role in 
identifying and investigating corruption.  
      Focusing Audit Planning on Areas of High Corruption Risk 
Some SAIs proactively identifies and monitors areas of their audit work where corruption is a risk, often as part 
of the audit planning process, and look to predict emerging risk areas. For example, it has been noted that 
auditors have had some notable success in identifying corrupt practices where they have examined claims by 
managers for payments to workers or where they have used inspection to identify sub-standard construction. 
NIK Poland, the Polish SAI, has used data available from its routine audit work to review the threat of corruption, 
specifically by mapping government sectors and highlighting areas of activity deemed susceptible to corruption. 
Similarly, the Hungarian State Audit Office specifically focuses on highlighting risks of corruption during audits 
and taking action where the evidence of criminality is identified. As of 2005 it had launched criminal 
proceedings in over fifty cases, relating to alleged criminal activity very often related to corruption. In addition it 
compiles summary reports examining trends in corrupt activity, and has used data collected to analyse 
underlying causes of corruption and correlate Hungary’s experience with wider indexes of corruption. 
4.2.2 Developing an Enabling Institutional Environment 
4.2.2.1 Forging Effective Relationships with Other National Institutions 
A strong and supportive institutional environment can assist SAIs in addressing corruption. In particular, it is 
critical that effective mechanisms exist for implementing the recommendations of audit reports. In this regard, 
key relationships with other national institutions will depend on the audit model employed in the country in 
question. SAIs working within a Westminster institutional model generally report findings to the Parliament’s 
Public Accounts Committee (PACs), or a committee with equivalent remit to debate the findings of audit reports, 
and draw attention to the causes of cases of corruption uncovered. In particular, where PACs have the power to 
call and hear testimony from witnesses, the system becomes increasingly accountable. PACs can publicise the 
findings of audits, demand reform where required and call for follow-up reports to assess whether issues 
identified in audit reports have been addressed. 
 It should be noted that many SAIs lack a system of reporting to a Parliamentary Committee, or even lack the 
mandate to make recommendations. In Botswana the SAI is accountable to the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, a government department which it also audits. Rather than reporting to the National 
Assembly, audit reports are addressed to the Minister of Finance, a situation which threatens effective 
accountability.  Where SAIs operates under the Judicial model, they will rely more heavily on an effective 
judicial system to ensure that recommendations are addressed promptly and fairly within the wider judicial 
process. 
4.2.2.2 Forging Closer Working Relationship with Law Enforcement Agencies 
Where SAIs liaise closely with enforcement officials in other government agencies, such as the police and 
specialist anti-corruption agencies, their capacity to detect corruption can be enhanced. Financial scandals in the 
mid 1990’s in Germany, for example, led to operational changes which brought both the German SAI and the 
taxation authorities into a closer working relationship with government agencies responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting crime, a move that was seen to boost the state’s overall investigative capacity. The role SAIs 
play in communicating corruption risks and cases of corrupt practice as identified by Magnus Borge (Director 
General of the INTOSAI Development Initiative) includes raising public awareness of the importance of 
transparency and accountability by producing timely and relevant audit reports which are available to the public. 
He notes that many SAIs have established links with the press to publicly disclose cases of fraud and 
corruption .The International Budget Partnership has highlighted the importance of civil society to publicising 
audit recommendations and campaigning for their implementation by audited bodies. For example, the South 
African Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Public Sector Accountability Monitor tracks allegations of misconduct 
in SAI reports, interviewing responsible officials to find out what action has taken in response and posting the 
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audio file of these interviews on the Internet. Where agencies are uncooperative, PSAM requests this information 
under the country’s Promotion of Access to Information Act.  
4.2.2.3 Engaging in Technical Cooperation with other SAIs 
The activities encompassing both deterrence and prevention and more active measures to counter corruption 
assume that the capacity exists to undertake audit work effectively. The reality is that SAIs in many countries, 
particularly developing countries, lacks the professional capacity to promote the Lima objectives. While 
mechanisms do exist for knowledge exchange between national SAI’s (for example staff secondments and 
twinning initiatives), these focus on sharing technical expertise and building capacity across the range of audit 
activities, and it appears that little technical cooperation focuses on techniques auditors can use to address 
corruption. Similarly, development programmes often aim to bolster accountability at the national level, by 
supporting SAIs as part of promoting a wider national culture of integrity. For example, USAID’s Open 
Government Initiative in Bulgaria aims to improve accountability mechanisms in Bulgarian public 
administration, in part by supporting the development of systems for internal control, enhancing the quality of 
supreme audit, and streamlining public procurement. 
 4.3 Recommendations for Strengthening the SAIs 
In view of the situation actually prevailing in a large number of SAIs, several actions for strengthening the SAIs 
have been recommended in extant literature. The following recommendations deal with, mostly, strengthening 
the SAI so that it can play its role in the fight against corruption effectively. 
4.3.1 Independence of SAI 
(a) The government should enforce a law that guarantees independence of the head of the SAI, allows wide 
publication of its reports and ensures implementation of its recommendation. Of significance is the independence 
of the SAI from the ministry of finance and ministry of establishment, responsible for hiring and firing of staff 
and creation of posts in the government. The SAI should also be independent to decide what to audit and how to 
audit. The head of SAI should have a secure tenure with requirements for accountability and performance 
assessment by the parliament or some such body to safeguard against abuse of power and corruption. 
(b) The audit law should allow or even require the SAI to report separately or at least distinctly on   opportunities 
of corruption that it noticed during its audit examination 
4.3.2 Powers of the SAI 
(c) The SAI should have the power to audit the accounts of individual tax payers, where an audit of tax 
administration suggests a possible collusion between the tax payer and the tax staff. The SAI should have the 
power to audit those organizations which get some grant or subsidy from the government. In case of large public 
works, the SAI should have the right to audit the payments received by the contractors from the government.  
(d) The law should provide the SAI with power to have access to all records in a timely manner, power to 
interview government employees and other relevant persons, and duty of all public sector organizations and their 
staff to cooperate with the SAI. The law should provide sanctions against those staffs and organizations that fail 
to comply with the requirement or willfully delay the provision of information to the SAI. 
(e) The SAI should have the authority to engage experts or consultants, should the technical nature of a 
department or agency so require. 
(f) The scope of SAI’s work should be comprehensive and the parliament should ensure its coverage to all such 
organizations where public funds are involved. One of the avenues of corruption is that some departments resist 
audit by the SAI on the plea that the information being handled by them is of sensitive nature and cannot be 
made public. Such departments are often prone to corruption. The mandate of the SAI should cover audit of such 
departments as well. However, special safeguards can be provided against leakage of information. For example, 
it can be provided that auditors below a certain level are not entrusted this type of work or the audit report is 
submitted to a very senior level only or the auditors of such assignments are first cleared by security agencies, 
etc. 
(g) The audit law should also make it obligatory for the non-governmental organizations receiving grant from the 
government to maintain their accounts in a transparent manner and such accounts should be within the power to 
the SAI to audit to the extent of funding by the government. 
4.3.3 Participatory Auditing 
(h) The SAI should develop a mechanism to engage the general public while planning its annual work. One 
possibility could be to provide a link on the SAI web-site inviting general public to indicate areas requiring 
SAI’s attention. This information could be called for in a structured manner. It would be real breakthrough in 
democratizing the SAIs12. 
(i) The SAI’s website should have an e-mail address and a form for communication with the office relating to 
corruption and fraud. People in general should be widely informed through media about this facility. The SAI 
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should have a system of receiving information on possible avenues of corruption and develop suitable 
recommendations to get the corrupt systems replaced by honest systems. 
(j) The SAI should plead with the government that in planning for development projects for the welfare of the 
people, especially, in areas of education, health, water supply, sanitation and so on, the local population should 
be involved in the project design. The needs of the local people should be reflected in deciding the location, size 
and service delivery management. Similarly, local committees can be formed to monitor the project execution 
and project performance. 
4.3.4 Implementation of Audit Recommendations 
(k) The SAI should try to create, with the help of government, an institutional mechanism to feed the results of 
audit in future economic planning. It means, before a development project or program is finally approved, there 
should be a system of clearance from an independent body that the current project or program plan does not 
commit the same mistakes which the past audit reports had pointed out. Unfortunately, this important step in the 
cycle of good governance is badly missing in most of the developing countries. The auditors keep on reporting 
same or similar irregularities or examples of mismanagement and embezzlement year after year and the 
executive hardly takes note of that. Future projects and programs commit the same mistakes. It is far more 
effective and economical to prevent the mistakes (intentional as well as unintentional) than to detect them and 
take corrective action. 
4.3.5 Review of Procedures and Training of Auditors 
(l) The SAI should play a leading role in persuading the government to set up an independent standing 
commission responsible for reviewing various law, rules, regulations and procedures in the entire government 
with a view to determining their adequacy for preventing corruption. The commission should work on a 
continuous basis to cover all public sector ministries, departments and agencies over a cycle of, say, three years. 
The objective of the commission should be to develop alternatives procedures and regulations, in consultation 
with the concerned organizations, for minimizing opportunities of corruption. 
(m) The SAI should set up a core group in its office, which should review and analyze government-wide rules, 
regulations and laws with a view to indicating areas that provide opportunities for corruption. The objective of 
this group should be to develop standard audit criteria for corruption auditing in various departments and 
agencies. The group should also prepare master trainers to train other auditors in corruption auditing. The group 
should work closely with the above mentioned commission and provide necessary input from the SAI’s point of 
view. The group should work for developing necessary proposals to be taken up with the government for 
changes in the systems and procedures. 
(n) The SAI should obtain in its budget resources for the training of its own staff as well for training the staff of 
the executive departments and agencies in creating awareness about corruption and preparing them to combat 
corruption. 
4.3.6 Code of Ethics 
(o) The SAI should, first of all, be seen above reproach. It should develop its own code of ethics. The code 
should not be a mere piece of paper. The head of the SAI should put in place a monitoring system to ensure that 
the auditors observe the code of ethics in letter and spirit. 
(p) The SAI should also persuade the government to develop and enforce code of ethics for all government 
employees. 
4.3.7 Performance of the SAI 
(q) The SAI should develop a comprehensive cost accounting system for its own office. All audits should accrue 
time and money spent on it. This will set an example for other organizations, indicating that the SAI has the 
highest standards of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The budget of the SAI should be in terms of money 
as well as person-days. The annual evaluation of the office should disclose the extent to which various targets 
were achieved within the allocated budget. 
 (r) The SAI should be an office with highest degree of transparency and accountability. A firm of chartered 
accountants should audit accounts of the SAI. The SAI should offer its own organization for evaluation in the 
broader scope of performance auditing by an independent firm of accountants. The SAI should provide access to 
the basis of various decisions taken during the year. 
4.3.8 Cooperation and Coordination 
(s) The SAI should develop a networking relationship with other enforcement agencies for sharing information 
and training of personnel on a reciprocal basis. 
(t) Fighting corruption requires cooperation and commitment at all levels, from global to local, and by 
government and non-governmental organizations. The SAI should make concerted efforts to be part of the global 
network engaged in fighting corruption. 
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(u) The SAI, public authorities, civil society, and the private sector should join hands in the fight against 
corruption through sharing of information and active coordination for division of labor. There should be open 
and frank discussion within these organizations about opportunities for corruption and about methods for 
minimizing it. 
 (v) The SAIs of different countries should sign Memorandums of Understanding to cooperate with one another 
in promoting and developing measure to prevent and fight against corruption through international programs and 
projects, including sharing training facilities on corruption auditing. 
4.4 Preparing the Auditors for Fight against Corruption 
Auditing against corruption is a specialized field and not much has been done by the profession to develop the 
skills of the auditors. It would require concerted efforts by the international community to build capacity among 
the auditors for fighting corruption through incisive auditing. It would require development of an appropriate 
training material on corruption auditing. The training program for auditors should contain, besides refresher 
course on general auditing techniques, such subjects as stated below: 
(a) Effective measures to prevent, detect, investigate, punish, and control corruption, including the use of 
evidence-gathering and investigative methods 
(b) Building capacity in the development and planning of strategic anti-corruption policy 
(c) A broad understanding of the operations of such public functions as procurement, land revenue, income tax, 
customs, police, public works, utilities, and so on, where corruption is rampant 
(d) An understanding of the fund transfer mechanism and money laundering techniques used by corrupt persons 
(e) Understanding of the laws relating to whistle-blowing, protection of witnesses, experts and victims, if any, in 
the country 
(f) Audit criteria on corruption auditing for different departments and functions. 
Exposing the auditors to this type of training could be expected to equip them with some tools for auditing 
against corruption, as it would enhance their understanding of the corrupt practices and the way they flourish and 
get protected. 
It would be preferable if professional bodies of auditors join hands in developing a generic set of core material 
on corruption auditing to be used globally, leaving the country-specific material to be developed by each country 
itself. 
It would also be desirable that the INTOSAI and its regional affiliated bodies organize seminars and conferences 
on corruption auditing, creating awareness and imparting skills among auditors against this menace. The 
developed countries can volunteer to provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries for 
training the auditors in this field. 
 
5. Challenges of the auditor in fighting corruption 
Auditors may come across situations, during their examinations, which smack of corruption. Since investigation 
requires different standards and skills, the auditors cannot get into the business of investigating a suspected case 
of corruption. However, they can forward extracts of their reports to investigating agencies for further probe. As 
compared to auditing, investigation is a different area of oversight. However, auditors can play a vital role in 
assisting the agencies responsible for investigation against alleged cases of corruption. The investigating agency 
could be an internal entity, some anti-corruption commission, police, judiciary or a specialized body for a mega 
corruption case. The investigation may be initiated on a complaint from a citizen, employee, auditor or a 
supervisor in an organization. Internal auditors usually have more diversified and detailed knowledge of 
operations in different parts of the organization than the investigating agency staff that may be deployed only for 
a particular case. The internal auditors can assist the investigating staff in interpreting various rules, in 
explaining various practices, in sharing some of the confidential information that they may possess or discussing 
technical details of operations. The internal auditors can pinpoint areas of excessive cost and weaker controls 
which can help the investigating staff in detecting corruption. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It respects no national boundaries and 
deepens poverty around the globe by distorting political, economic and social life. Corruption undermines good 
government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private 
sector and particularly hurts the poor.  Audit is one of the mechanisms for fighting corruption and the society 
expects the auditors to play an effective role in reducing, if not eliminating, corruption. Therefore, the public 
sector auditor cannot be indifferent but must rise up to the challenges of combating corruption by effectively 
conducting financial audits of government institutions’ accounting procedures and financial statements to ensure 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.4, 2013 
 
131 
accuracy and fairness, and compliance audits of reviewing the legality of transactions made by the audited body 
in addition to the scrutiny of the operational efficiency, economy (cost-effectiveness) and overall effectiveness of 
government programmes through performance or value for money audits.  While it is generally believed that the 
auditors cannot quantify corruption nor can they report the actual event of corruption, they can at least help in 
preventing corruption by pointing out areas where opportunities for corruption exist. The auditors can succeed 
only if the enabling environment exists for fighting corruption. Effective control of corruption in Nigeria 
requires the commitment and involvement of all citizens.  
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